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Abstract 
 
 The United States requires a substantial investment in transmission capacity over 
the next several decades.  This investment is needed to ensure system reliability, to 
accommodate growth in demand for electricity, and to allow the integration of significant 
amounts of renewable generating capacity. In this paper I survey the need for new 
transmission capacity and consider the financial and regulatory obstacles that stand in the 
way of this new investment. 
 
 This paper makes three points.  First, the historical pace of transmission 
investments will not be adequate to enhance grid reliability or to allow largescale 
penetration of renewable generating capacity.  Second, the replacement of a vertically 
integrated electric utility industry in many parts of the country by a more disaggregated 
one composed of merchant generators has added to the challenge of transmission 
planning and investment.  Third, the focus on federal funding for grid improvements is 
misplaced. There is no evidence that the private sector is incapable of raising the funds 
needed for critical investment, provided a rationalized regulatory structure is put into 
place. 
 
 Making changes to our regulatory and political systems that facilitate transmission 
investment and siting will not be easy. But the costs of underinvesting in an improved 
and enlarged national transmission grid are high. Moving to a largely carbon-free 
economy by the middle of the century will require a transformation of the power system 
in this country, one that cannot be successful without a strong interstate high-voltage 
transmission backbone. 
 
 
 
Financial support for this project was provided by the Manhattan Institute for Policy 
Research. I have benefited from the helpful comments of Ignacio Pérez-Arriaga and Bill 
Hogan. They are in no way responsible for any remaining error 
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Financing a National Transmission Grid: What Are the Issues? 
 
I. Introduction 
 An integral part of the Obama administration’s energy policy is the dramatic 
expansion of renewable electricity production. The American Clean Energy and Security 
Act of 2008 (H. 2454) establishes a national renewable portfolio standard mandating that 
20 percent of the nation’s electricity come from renewable sources by 2020.1 Optimism 
about wind, in particular, runs high. 
 A recent U.S. Department of Energy (2008) study considered scenarios in which 
20 percent of the nation’s electricity is provided by wind by 2030. It concluded that this 
goal could be reached at an incremental cost of roughly 2 percent over baseline 
projections of energy costs. Reaching it would require significant incremental capital 
costs, including an expansion of the national transmission network by approximately $20 
billion in net present value. Increased capital costs would be offset by substantial savings 
in fuel costs. 
 Enthusiasm for renewable electricity generation abounds at the state level as well. 
Twenty-seven states have set mandatory portfolio standards, and five others have 
established voluntary standards.2 Increased penetration of renewable electricity sources 
would accompany what is projected to be a significant rise in overall demand for 
                                                        
1 The text for H.R. 2454 is available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h2454pcs.txt.pdf  
2 See list at http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm. 
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electricity over coming decades. But improvements in the nation’s transmission network 
would be needed to ensure reliability. 
 These various trends and policy initiatives all draw attention to the need for a 
major investment in the nation’s interstate transmission grid. This paper investigates the 
infrastructure needs and the barriers that stand in the way of transmission infrastructure 
investment. In particular, I consider the available options to finance that investment and 
the role that the government should play. 
 While the absolute dollar amounts that investment in interstate transmission 
requires are large, the costs are relatively modest when expressed as a fraction of total 
electricity costs. Cost is likely not a significant barrier to investment, but cost-allocation 
and siting issues are. Despite the call by some for federal financing of high-voltage grid 
infrastructure, I argue that the government would do better to focus on reducing the 
political and regulatory barriers to investment. 
 Section II of this paper reviews projected growth in electricity use and projections 
of needed investment in new high-voltage transmission capacity. I also provide some 
estimates of the costs of that investment. Section III surveys the regulatory framework 
and the incentives and barriers to private investment in interstate transmission capital. I 
turn to financing issues and options in section IV. Section V provides an assessment of 
key policy issues, and section VI concludes. 
II. Investment Needs for a Twenty-First-Century Grid 
 Electricity in the United States requires generating plants, a transmission network, 
and local distribution. To understand the electrical transmission and distribution system, 
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we begin with a basic description of the transmission network and a history of regulatory 
oversight in the United States. 
 
Figure 1. Electricity Generation, Transmission, and Distribution 
 
Graphic courtesy of North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 
 
 Figure 1 shows a very simple electricity network. Electricity is generated at a 
power station and transformed to high voltage to facilitate long-distance transmission 
with minimal loss in transit. The generator, for example, might be a wind farm in eastern 
Montana. Electricity is sent over transmission lines to load centers. Wind from Montana, 
for example, might be sold into power markets in the Chicago area. At the demand 
center, the high-voltage electricity is transformed back to voltage levels usable by 
industrial, commercial, and residential customers. Voltage requirements might range 
from 120 volts (residential appliances) to 13,000 volts or higher in industrial settings. 
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 As of 2008, the United States had a little over 1,000 gigawatts of electricity-
generating capacity (see Table 1 below).3 Overall, capacity is expected to grow 16.8 
percent between 2008 and 2035, according to the Energy Information Administration’s 
most recent Annual Energy Outlook. In contrast, solar capacity is expected to grow by a 
factor of eleven, and wind capacity is expected to nearly quadruple (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2009a). 
 
Table 1. Net Summer Generating Capacity 
Fuel Source Megawatts Share 
Coal 313,322 31% 
Natural Gas 399,427 40% 
Nuclear 100,755 10% 
Petroleum 57,445 6% 
Hydroelectric 
Conventional 77,930 8% 
Other Renewables 38,493 4% 
Pumped Storage 21,858 2% 
All Energy Sources 1,010,171  
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2010.  Total includes 
assorted other energy sources not broken out separately.  Because of 
rounding, share numbers do not sum exactly to 100%. 
                                                        
3 A gigawatt (GW) equals 1,000 megawatts (MW), which, in turn, equals 1,000 kilowatts 
(KW).  
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 The rapid growth of renewable electricity, albeit starting from a very low base, 
presents a challenge for the nation’s high-voltage transmission network. The current 
voltage transmission network in the United States comprises over 365,000 circuit miles 
of lines of at least 100 kilovolts (kV).4 Of this amount, roughly 165,000 circuit miles are 
of lines 200 kV or higher. In its annual electricity supply and demand (ES&D) survey for 
2009, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) projected an 8.6 
percent increase in transmission circuit lines miles between 2009 and 2018. Growth rates 
for lines are weighted toward the larger voltages (see Figure 2), with a growth rate of 
over 40 percent for lines in the 400–600 kV range. 
Figure 2. Transmission Line Growth Rates: 2009–18 
 
Source: NERC, 2009, ES&D data 
 
                                                        
4 This includes 2,277 miles of DC lines, most of which are in the 400–600 kV range. The 
entire network in the NERC system, including parts of Canada, is nearly 450,000 circuit 
miles. See North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2009, Table 6. 
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 The bulk of the growth in total miles added (under construction, planned, or 
conceptual) is in the 200–600 kV range (see Figure 3). One-fifth of the growth is in the 
200–300 kV range, with roughly one-third in the 300–400 kV and an equal amount in the 
400–600 kV range. 
Figure 3. Distribution of Total Line Additions by Voltage 
 
Source: NERC, 2009, ES&D data 
 Investment patterns differ across the various interconnections. While the Eastern 
Interconnection anticipates a 10 percent increase in high-voltage transmission (lines of 
200 kV or higher), Texas projects a 50 percent increase, according to NERC.5 A major 
purpose of these increases is to improve the integration of variable-generation sources. 
                                                        
5 The United States has three self-contained electricity generation, transmission, and 
distribution networks: the Eastern Interconnection, Texas, and the Western 
Interconnection. See section III.2 below for a fuller discussion of the organization of 
today’s electricity system. 
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The Western Interconnection also anticipates increased transmission investment, which 
would improve integration of renewable generation. Growth is projected at over 20 
percent for this region. 
 
Table 2. Transmission Lines at End of 2008 
 100–120 121–150 151–199 200–299 300–399 400–599 600+ Total 
Existing 
Transmission Lines 104,502 67,046 26,956 81,172 55,245 27,776 2,361 365,058
Total Line 
Additions 105,862 68,323 27,674 87,561 67,363 39,691 2,646 396,474
Projected Growth  1.3% 1.9% 2.7% 7.9% 21.9% 42.9% 12.1% 8.6%
Source: NERC, 2009, ES&D data 
Data are for United States only. Unit of measure is a circuit mile. Total line additions include transmission lines under construction, 
planned, or conceptual. 
 
 
 NERC, in its most recent reliability assessment, expressed concern about the pace 
of investment in new transmission lines, stating that siting and construction will “need to 
significantly accelerate to maintain reliability over the coming ten years.” (NERC, 2009, 
p. 29). Construction has averaged around 6,000 circuit miles per five-year planning 
period. NERC projects a need for 16,000 circuit miles over the next five years. Finally, 
NERC estimates that roughly one-third of new investment in transmission lines of 200 
kV or higher will be required to ensure reliability and another one-third to integrate 
variable renewable generation into the grid. In contrast, NERC estimates that only 7 
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percent of new investment will be required to integrate new fossil fuel, hydro, and 
nuclear generation. 
 Estimates of the cost of investments in the transmission grid vary. In a recent 
report for the Edison Foundation, Chupka et al. (2008) assign a cost of approximately 
$880 billion (measured in nominal dollars) for integrating renewable technology into the 
grid as well as for continuing to make smart grid investments over the next twenty years. 
The authors break this down into $300 billion for transmission investment, slightly less 
than one-third of which will be for 230 kV lines or larger, and $580 billion for new 
distribution investment. Under their “realistically achievable policy” scenario, by 
contrast, the authors project an investment in generation infrastructure of $505 billion 
over this period, assuming gains in energy efficiency and reductions in demand. 
 The Edison Electric Institute reports data on actual and planned investments in 
new transmission capacity. Table 3 shows actual investments (in 2007 dollars) for the 
first part of the decade ranging from $5 billion to $8 billion annually. Planned 
investments for the last three years of this decade, by contrast, rose to roughly $10 billion 
annually.  
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Table 3. Transmission 
Investment by Investor-
Owned Utilities 
Year Investment 
2000 4.9 
2001 5.1 
2002 5.2 
2003 5.7 
2004 5.7 
2005 6.8 
2006 7.6 
2007 7.8 
2008 9.4 
2009 10.4 
2010 11.0 
Billions of 2007 dollars. Data for 
2008–10 are projected. 
Source: EEI 
 
A survey of member companies by the Edison Electric Institute (2010) identified $58 
billion (nominal) in transmission projects planned for completion by 2020. EEI notes that 
this is not an exhaustive list, but it does identify some useful trends. The survey focuses 
on three types of investments: 
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• Transmission line and support investments 
• Transmission supporting the integration of renewable resources 
• Transmission-related smart grid projects 
 We can calibrate the EEI estimates a bit by applying cost per GW-mile estimates 
to the NERC line additions anticipated for the next decade. Table 4 reports estimates of 
unit transmission cost from Chupka et al. (2008). 
Table 4. Unit Transmission Costs in 2008 Dollars 
Voltage 
(kV) 
Cost 
($1,000/mile) 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Cost (Millions of 
Dollars per GW-
Mile) 
230 $2,076 500 $5.46 
345 $2,539 967 $2.85 
500 $4,328 2,040 $1.45 
765 $6,577 5,000 $1.32 
Source: Chupka et al., 2008, table 4-1 
 
 Using those unit costs, Chupka et al. (2008) estimated a cost over the 2008–15 
period of $32.5 billion in nominal dollars (applying a 1.9 percent inflation rate to the 
2007 unit costs) for investment in 230 kV lines or higher. Applying those unit costs to the 
NERC ES&D data for 2009 (covering anticipated investments between 2009 and 2018) 
yields an estimate of investment costs for 230 kV lines or higher of $90.8 billion in 
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constant 2008 dollars.6 The higher costs reflect, in part, growth in the anticipated need for 
investment in transmission capacity. 
 These numbers are significant, but it is important to keep them in perspective. 
Annual expenditures on electricity are projected to be about $350 billion, according to 
data from the most recent Annual Energy Outlook (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2009a, table 8). The present value of those expenditures over the coming 
decade (discounted at a 5 percent real rate) is $2.6 trillion. Even if investments in 
transmission infrastructure turn out to be double the estimates made here, they would still 
account for only 7 percent of electricity’s total retail cost. As I discuss below, cost by 
itself may be less of an issue than cost allocation, which is an activity with political and 
distributional implications. 
 While some of the investments that NERC anticipates will be needed over the 
coming decade would address the problem of low reserve margins in some NERC 
regions (specifically, the Midwest and western Canada), much of the investment in 
transmission will be needed to accommodate renewable generation capacity expected to 
come on line over the coming decade. NERC projects some 260 GW of new renewable 
capacity coming on line then, with the vast majority of that (249 GW) in the form of wind 
or solar. 
 
                                                        
6 This estimate includes conceptual investments (investments identified by NERC that 
have been included in a transmission plan, a line required to meet a NERC TPL standard, 
and projected lines not under construction or planned as identified by NERC members). 
Eliminating the conceptual investments lowers the estimate to $53.2 billion. 
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 The NERC analysis notes that state Renewable Portfolio Standards programs will 
drive much of the increase in intermittent capacity and expresses concerns about the 
current siting and approval process for new transmission projects. I return to this issue 
below. But the report identifies key siting issues that are worth listing, as they make clear 
the challenge facing policymakers: 
Siting of new bulk power transmission lines brings with it unique 
challenges due to the high visibility, their span through multiple 
states/provinces and, potentially, the amount of coordination/cooperation 
required among multiple regulating agencies and authorities. Lack of 
consistent and agreed-upon cost-allocation approaches, coupled with 
public opposition due to land-use and property valuation concerns, have 
[sic], at times, resulted in long delays in transmission construction. When 
construction is delayed, special operating procedures to maintain bulk 
power system reliability may be needed. For example, it took the 
American Electric Power Company fourteen years to obtain siting 
approval for a 90-mile 765 kV transmission project, while it required only 
two to construct it. 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2009, pp. 60–61 
 Presenting particular challenges to power planners are regional variable-
generation “hot spots.” The Southwest Power Pool (SPP), for example, has roughly 50 
GW of wind in its Generation Interconnection queue, according to the NERC analysis. 
SPP has formed a Wind Integration Task Force to evaluate how best to integrate wind 
into the SPP transmission system (NERC, p. 115). The state of Texas has created 
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Competitive Renewable Energy Zones (CREZs) with special rules to facilitate 
transmission from wind-rich areas of Texas (West Texas and the Panhandle) to 
population and energy centers in the state. Currently, there is inadequate transmission to 
serve the CREZs. Finally, the Southwest Transmission Expansion Planning (STEP) 
group, composed of stakeholders from Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and California, 
are engaged in a multiyear effort to plan upgrades of capabilities for transmitting 
electricity across those four states. Three sets of upgrades were proposed to increase 
transmission capability by 3 GW. According to the NERC report, two sets of upgrades 
have been substantially completed, but the third set, the Palo Verde to Devers 500 kV 
transmission line, has been held up by Arizona’s refusal to permit the line within its 
borders (NERC, 2009, p. 164). 
III. The Regulatory Framework 
 The focus of this paper is on incentives and financing mechanisms for new 
transmission investment. In order to know what steps the United States should take to 
meet its need for new investment in transmission infrastructure, we need to understand 
how the electric-utility sector is regulated and how changes in regulatory procedure are 
altering the investment landscape. We turn to that topic now. 
1. Utility Regulation: Old Style 
Historically, electric utilities operated as vertically integrated entities in a regulated 
environment. The common view—borne out by historical experience—was that large 
economies of scale existed in generation, transmission, and distribution. A single firm 
providing electricity to customers in a region would avoid duplicative fixed costs and 
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would spread the costs of large generating plants and transmission and distribution 
infrastructure over many customers. 
 In return for being granted the right to a local monopoly, electric utilities were 
made subject to regulation, primarily at the state level, though for projects crossing state 
lines as well as certain types of investment (e.g., nuclear power plants), federal regulation 
also came into play. Most state regulators set retail rates using rate-of-return regulation 
(see Viscusi et al., 2005 for a fuller discussion of regulation). In short, utilities would 
submit data on their costs of operation and the size of their installed capital base (rate 
base). After negotiation with the utility in a quasi-judicial rate proceeding, the regulator 
would set electric rates that were projected to raise sufficient revenue to cover allowed 
costs and to earn a “reasonable” rate of return on the utility’s rate base. The return on the 
rate base was also subject to negotiation in the proceeding. 
 This approach worked well through the 1950s and 1960s, or as long as nominal 
electricity prices held firm and real prices kept falling (see Figure 4). However, the 
spiraling costs of nuclear power, along with sharp increases in the price of oil and natural 
gas, which began with the first oil shock in 1973, led inevitably to sharp increases in 
retail electricity prices. Nominal rates on average more than tripled, while real rates 
increased by roughly two-thirds between 1973 and 1982. With the accident at the Three 
Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania in 1979 and the nuclear-power-related 
bond default by the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) in 1983, the 
system appeared to be unraveling. 
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Figure 4. U.S. Average Retail Electricity Prices 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2009b 
 Changes to the existing structure began with the passage of the Public Utilities 
Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA), which allowed “qualifying facilities” to sell 
wholesale power to vertically integrated utilities. The qualifying facilities would be 
allowed to sell power to the regulated utilities at the latter’s avoided costs of producing 
power. While straightforward in concept, avoided cost was determined by regulators, 
who typically set high rates for it—attractive for the qualifying facilities but effectively 
creating incentives for a flood of high-cost capacity. 
 Hogan (2008) argues that spurring the movement away from regulated generation 
was the successful deregulation of pricing in the trucking, airline, and natural-gas 
industries, as well as the experience of other countries. Partial divestiture of vertically 
integrated utilities could allow competition to develop in the generation of electricity and 
provide a countervailing force to the escalating costs of construction of new power plants. 
While some of the appeal of restructured markets was dampened by the California 
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electricity crisis (Borenstein, 2002 provides an excellent analysis of the crisis), 
restructuring has proceeded to a point where roughly half the generating capacity in the 
United States is operating under some form of restructuring that rests on functioning 
wholesale power markets (Joskow, 2006, table 1). 
2. Utility Regulation: New Style 
 To understand the current state of regulation in the United States, it is useful to 
consider how electricity networks operate. The United States organizes electricity 
networks in a number of ways. At the most basic level, there are three interconnections in 
the United States: the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the 
Texas (ERCOT) Interconnection (see Figure 5). An interconnection is a connected AC 
power grid all of whose lines are synchronized to the same frequency. As these three 
interconnections are not synchronized, AC lines cannot connect the three 
interconnections. DC power lines can interconnect, and currently there are a handful of 
DC lines that cross interconnection borders. 
 Within interconnection regions, NERC regional entities serve to coordinate 
planning and operation to ensure reliable electricity production. The eight NERC regions 
within the three interconnections (excluding the Quebec Interconnection) are shown in 
Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. U.S. Interconnection Regions 
 
Source: NERC, 2009 
 
 Within NERC regions, electricity generation and transmission operate under a 
variety of regulatory frameworks. The traditional approach was one of vertical 
integration, whereby a single utility in a region (or state) was responsible for generating, 
transmitting, and distributing electricity to its customers. Certain regions of the country 
have restructured their utility industries to allow competition in generation and have 
developed power markets for day-ahead and spot trading of electricity. Since electricity 
generation and demand must be balanced at all times, oversight is required to ensure 
minute-by-minute equilibrium in markets. Responsibility for that falls to Independent 
System Operators (ISOs) and Regional Transmission Operators (RTOs). 
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 The ten ISOs and RTOs in the United States and Canada serve two-thirds of 
electricity consumers in the United States and roughly half of the consumers in Canada, 
according to the ISO/RTO Council (2009) (see Figure 6). ISOs and RTOs are responsible 
for organizing and overseeing wholesale power markets in their region and ensuring the 
overall stability of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. As such, they 
coordinate wholesale power markets and oversee transmission planning in their region. 
 For our purposes, the distinction between an RTO and an ISO is immaterial. 
Below I will often refer to an ISO. All comments made about ISOs apply equally to 
RTOs. 
Figure 6. ISO and RTO Structure in the United States and Canada 
 
Source: ISO/RTO Council 
 The ISO and RTO regions overlap states that have engaged in electricity 
restructuring to one degree or another (see Figure 7). 
 19 
 
 
Figure 7. Electricity Restructuring as of 2010 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html 
 
 As described in Hogan (2008), the ISOs developed spot markets for electricity 
using a “bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch with locational marginal 
prices as the market foundation and substitute for the contract-path model” (p. 12). A 
simple example illustrates how locational marginal pricing works. Consider a simple 
electrical network with two nodes and one line connecting them. A node is a location 
where electricity can enter (generation) or exit (load) the network. 
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Figure 8. A Simple Electrical Network 
 
 At the left-hand node, a generator offers to supply q1 MWh (megawatt hours) of 
electricity at a price per MWh of c1. Demand for electricity at this node is y1. Similarly, a 
generator at the right-hand node offers to supply q2 at price c2. Demand at this node is y2. 
With sufficient competition, generators will have an incentive to bid a price equal to their 
marginal cost of generation. For purposes of this discussion, I will assume perfect 
competition in generation.7 The power line connecting the two nodes has a capacity limit 
of K MWs. The flow along the line from the left to the right node is measured as f, and 
negative values indicate power flowing from right to left. Since electricity generation and 
load must balance at all times, we have the following relationships: 
fyq
fyq
−=
+=
22
11  
 These two equations plus the capacity-constraint equation, Kf ≤ , define the 
electrical network. Assuming that we have sufficient generation to satisfy load at all 
times, the issue for the ISO dispatcher is how to satisfy load demands at minimum cost. 
                                                        
7 For evidence on market power in wholesale electricity markets, see Wolfram, 1999; 
Borenstein et al., 2002; and Mansur, 2008. 
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Assume the electricity from generator 1 is cheaper than electricity from generator 2 (c1 < 
c2 ). If all demand can be satisfied by generator 1, then the price paid for electricity by 
consumers at both nodes would be c1, and generator 1 would receive c1 per MWh sold. 
 This solution works so long as y2 does not exceed K. If not, the transmission line 
becomes congested and the dispatcher must use generator 2. Now 
Kyq
Kyq
−=
+=
22
11  
 With a congested network, locational marginal pricing can be used to provide the 
appropriate short-term pricing signals to consumers. The idea behind locational marginal 
pricing is to pay each generator its system marginal cost of production (as determined by 
the bids it offers). In the present case, with no generation capacity constraints, this comes 
down to paying each generator according to its marginal cost. 
 For consumers at y1, an increase in demand can be satisfied by generator 1 at 
marginal cost c1. Thus the price paid by consumers at y1 would be c1. An increase in 
demand by consumers at y2 cannot be satisfied by increasing generation at generator 1 
because of the capacity constraint. Instead, the marginal load would have to be served by 
generator 2 at cost c2. The price of electricity at node 2 would thus be c2. The revenue 
received by generator 1 will be c1(y1 + K), while the revenue received by generator 2 will 
be c2 (y2– K).  
 Note that the payment to generator 1 does not exhaust the revenue from 
consumers at node 2, since the load at y2 paid c2y2. The difference (c2–c1)K is the 
transmission congestion rent, which would be paid to whoever has been deemed the 
owner of those rents. They might, for example, be owned by the developer of the 
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transmission line and provide a source of revenue for partially defraying the construction 
costs of the line to be charged to network users.8 
 Pricing gets more complicated in more complex transmission networks. Indeed, it 
is easy to construct examples in which the marginal cost of supplying electricity to new 
demand at some node exceeds the marginal cost of producing the electricity by all 
generators.9 The essential points to take away relate to a new disconnect between 
generation and load servicing. More specifically, in the transition from vertically 
integrated to restructured markets in many areas of the country, decisions about 
investment in generation might not be taking into account their impact on the 
transmission and distribution system. This increased separation of generation and load 
also elevates the importance of financing for transmission. The importance of 
transmission is magnified by the role that wind- and solar-generated electricity is 
                                                        
8 This description abstracts from a number of important market considerations. First, I 
have ignored line losses. While of practical import, they can be priced in a similar fashion 
as load and generation with congestion. I have also ignored various financial instruments 
that are used by power sellers and buyers to hedge risk. Contracts for differences and 
transmission congestion contracts are two financial instruments available to market 
participants. See Hogan, 1992 and Bushnell and Stoft, 1996, among others, for discussion 
on this point. 
9 The marginal cost of serving demand can exceed the marginal cost of any individual 
generator if the marginal demand requires the cutting back of a low-cost generator due to 
congestion and the consequent larger increase in generation required from a higher-cost 
generator to serve marginal demand. 
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expected to play in federal and state policy in coming years. How will the investments in 
transmission be financed, and what role should government perform in overseeing or 
perhaps providing financing? I turn to these questions next. 
IV. Financing Issues and Options 
 The simple network example above illustrates the point that congested 
transmission networks create rents that can be used to defray costs of the transmission 
infrastructure. Under what circumstances would these congestion rents be sufficient to 
finance new transmission investment? This is the key question underlying the idea of 
merchant transmission investment. If private investors can recoup their costs of 
investment (including an adequate return on capital), then new investment in transmission 
capital can be left to them, just as new generation has been. The idea that merchant 
transmission investors can be compensated with transmission congestion rights (rights to 
congestion rents) was put forward by Hogan (1992) and Bushnell and Stoft (1996, 1997). 
Necessary conditions include that the transmission network be optimally sized and that 
prices provide correct market signals to all parties. 
 Pérez-Arriaga et al. (1995) and Joskow and Tirole (2005) argue that the 
conditions under which transmission congestion rents would be sufficient to cover the 
full costs of transmission investment are quite restrictive and unlikely to hold in practice. 
One reason is that it is unlikely that the transmission investment would be of optimal size. 
Pérez-Arriaga et al. (1995) note that high fixed costs of transmission investment and the 
potential high political costs of underinvestment in transmission lead to overinvestment 
in anticipation of future growth. Until demand catches up with transmission investment, 
congestion rents would be inadequate to cover all investment costs. In addition, network 
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design requirements to ensure reliability (N-1 or similar rules) lead to overinvestment, 
again making congestion rents inadequate to cover investment costs. On the basis of their 
experience in a diversity of power systems, Pérez-Arriaga et al. (2009) estimate that 
congestion rents cover only about 20 percent of total investment costs.10 
 An additional prerequisite to achieving efficiency is a congestion rent that serves 
as an accurate measure of the social benefits of marginal transmission investments. 
Joskow and Tirole (2005) provide a number of examples of market imperfections where 
that equality breaks down. Some involve the exercise of market power by some 
participant in the game. Preemption is another reason: added transmission capacity 
competes with new generation in a congested region. If the length of time required to site 
a new transmission line exceeds the time required to site new generation, the new 
transmission may be deterred, even if it is socially preferable to build new transmission 
rather than new generation capacity. 
 If the value of rights to transmission congestion charges is not sufficient to cover 
the costs of investment, additional revenues will be needed. A variety of approaches have 
been put forward to fund transmission costs over and above the value of transmission 
                                                        
10 Hogan (personal communication, April 27, 2010) points out that the real problem 
facing policymakers is how to reconcile the coexistence of merchant transmission with a 
socialized investment model. As Hogan notes, “Developing rules for hybrid systems is a 
real challenge, but the first step is to recognize that regulated mandatory transmission 
would compete with voluntary merchant transmission and compete with voluntary 
choices for investments in generation capacity and demand response. How can we design 
the rules so that all these pieces fit together and are credible and sustainable?” 
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congestion charges. In general, cost allocation can be done in two ways: costs can be 
allocated to beneficiaries of a project; or they can be socialized across the network. The 
former approach has the merit of matching benefits and costs and can provide appropriate 
economic signals for new investment. Measuring and allocating benefits, however, is a 
difficult task, especially when the evolution of the transmission network changes the 
nature of the benefit.11 Spreading costs over all existing users, in contrast, is much 
simpler and avoids what might be arbitrary assumptions and judgments about benefits. 
Cost socialization is appealing on the grounds of simplicity but does not provide 
economic price signals and may be perceived as unfair to the extent that system users are 
paying for transmission investments that are of no obvious value to them. 
 Postage-stamp allocation is the most common form of cost socialization. It 
spreads the cost uniformly across users on a per-megawatt or megawatt-hour basis. This 
approach is simple but, as noted above, may not accord with network users’ notions of 
fairness to the extent that users differentially benefit from network expansion. Postage-
stamp allocation has been commonly used in Europe and in U.S. markets. 
 “Beneficiary-pays” principles have been applied in instances of new transmission 
investment where the value of a new line can be attributed to generators and load on 
some basis. While reasonable in concept, this principle implies that the benefits of a line 
are determined by comparison with the counterfactual of the absence of a line. The 
counterfactual, however, may be utterly unrealistic, given the very strong likelihood that 
                                                        
11 The cost of interconnecting to the grid is easily allocated to the primary beneficiary: 
the generator wishing to interconnect. Much of the investment in the grid is for network 
enhancements, however. I discuss this distinction further in the next section. 
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a network of some kind would have developed to handle demand. In principle – though 
difficult in practice, the value of a new line should be calculated by subtracting the 
benefits that a more evolutionary or improvised response to demand would have yielded 
from the benefits that a new line yields. The starting point for calculating its value should 
not be the complete absence of benefits that would result from the line’s abrupt 
elimination. The latter approach exaggerates the incremental value of a new line. 
 Reliability standards create difficulties for the beneficiary-pays principle, since 
the nonoccurrence of a network failure may render a line redundant in the strictest sense. 
The beneficiary-pays principle would then suggest that there is no benefit to this line—
and thus no one to whom costs can be allocated. 
 Network usage is a third approach to financing transmission costs. It can be 
implemented in a number of ways (marginal or average participation, contract paths, 
etc.). Whatever the specific approach used, the basic idea is to allocate costs on the basis 
of usage of the network. The main difficulty here is that a unique way to measure usage 
does not exist and as a result the allocation of costs is inherently arbitrary, despite 
apparently clear allocation rules based on usage. 
 So long as locational pricing is used to address short-term congestion issues, the 
focus of recovering transmission investment costs can be on efficiency and fairness. 
Ramsey pricing could be used to recover investment costs with minimal loss of 
efficiency. Ramsey pricing allocates the burden in inverse proportion to the elasticity of 
demand of users on the network. This would tend to shift costs away from large industrial 
customers, which are better able to adjust demand when prices are high, and toward 
smaller residential and commercial customers on the load end, who are more price-
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inelastic. Alternatively, a focus on fairness would suggest allocation schemes such as the 
Aumann-Shapley approach. An example of this approach applied to the Brazilian 
network is provided by Junqueira et al. (2007). 
 Different ISO regions have taken different approaches to allocating transmission 
investment costs. Hogan (2008) cites testimony by a former Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) chairman describing allocation procedures by the various ISOs: 100 
percent socialization of costs by ISO New England, one-third socialization by the 
Southwest Power Pool, 20 percent by the Midwest ISO, and 100 percent for high-voltage 
transmission by PJM Interconnection. 
 The distinctions among these various approaches are probably less important than 
anticipatory network builds and interstate cost allocation. “Anticipatory network builds” 
refers to the possibility that new generation development will occur in stages within a 
given region (one, say, with high wind potential). But economies of scale in transmission 
investment dictate building the transmission network extension all at once, in anticipation 
of the full generation build-out. Who bears the costs of the network expansion in the 
years before full generation build-out occurs? 
 Cost allocation is the second area of concern. Many renewable-energy projects 
will require significant investments in interstate transmission capacity. A lack of clear 
guidance at the national level as to how cost allocation will be achieved serves as a 
barrier to this kind of investment. As noted in a recent Department of Energy advisory 
committee report, “The difficulty in determining who should pay for transmission that 
benefits many users across multiple jurisdictions, for a variety of purposes and over a 
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long time, is a serious obstacle to transmission investment” (Electricity Advisory 
Committee, 2009, p. 50). 
 The first issue—anticipatory network builds—has been a focus of attention for 
ISOs, FERC, and various states. Kaplan (2009) notes that no standard approach has been 
settled on. California has taken the approach of allocating to ratepayers, through a 
transmission access charge, a portion of the costs of new transmission of electricity from 
renewable energy sources that future generators will draw upon. As more generation that 
was anticipated by that network expansion comes on line, costs will be shifted from the 
general rate base to the generators that benefit from the expansion of transmission 
capacity (see Kaplan, n. 56). 
 In response to the issue of anticipatory network builds, some have called for direct 
investment in transmission by the federal government. For example, Governor Jon 
Huntsman of Colorado and Governor Brian Schweitzer of Montana, writing on behalf of 
the Western Governors’ Association, asked House and Senate leaders in early 2009 to 
enact a set of policies that would ensure the construction of sufficient capacity in high-
voltage transmission lines to bring large amounts of wind, solar, and geothermal 
electricity to market over the next several decades (Huntsman and Schweitzer, 2009). The 
two governors noted that staged investment in renewable generation creates the 
possibility of inefficiently low levels of transmission investment that will be locked in, 
once completed (an example of the holdup discussed in Joskow and Tirole, 2005). In 
particular, the association recommends that the federal government do the following: 
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• Enact legislation to fund the upsizing of near-term transmission projects proposed 
to serve large, geographically constrained, low-carbon resource areas. 
• Enact legislation to preserve the ability to expand, to their maximum technical 
capabilities, other proposed projects to large, geographically constrained, low-carbon 
resource areas. 
• Increase the borrowing authority and authorization for federal power marketing 
administrations for transmission construction to move geographically constrained, low-
carbon generation. 
• Provide that interest on bonds issued by or on behalf of states or local 
governments to finance transmission facilities in furtherance of developing 
geographically constrained, low-carbon resources is exempt from federal income tax. 
• Redirect the implementation of Sections 1221 and 368 of the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005 to focus on expedited cooperative actions with states to preserve transmission 
corridors and ensure the timely siting and permitting of large transmission lines to move 
geographically constrained, low-carbon generation. 
(Huntsman and Schweitzer 2009, p. 2) 
 The Western Governors’ Association conflates two issues: federal funding for 
transmission projects and improved regulatory guidelines at the federal level that would 
facilitate regional transmission planning. If the appropriate pricing signal (e.g., a carbon 
tax or cap-and-trade system) or a well-designed policy that sets renewable-portfolio 
standards is put into place beside an appropriate regulatory cost-allocation model, the 
financial incentives to build transmission lines naturally follow. If an appropriate pricing 
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signal and cost-allocation model are put into place, federal subsidization of transmission 
investment should not be necessary. 
 The construction of appropriate regulatory rules and procedures is essential, and 
here the federal government can continue to take leadership. Developing model 
regulatory structures to address anticipatory network builds will help address the holdup 
from suboptimal transmission investment in the short run. FERC’s approval of CAISO’s 
(California Independent System Operator’s)proposed funding mechanism for “location-
constrained” renewable resources is one example. In its April 19, 2007, decision (Docket 
EL07-033), FERC “found that the CAISO’s proposal strikes a reasonable balance that 
addresses barriers impeding the development of location-constrained resources while at 
the same time including appropriate ratepayer productions so as to ensure that rates are 
just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory” (Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 2007).12 
 While a strong case can be made that federal funds are not required to support 
transmission infrastructure investment, it is less clear what principles for cost allocation 
will be most effective at addressing the ongoing tension between the federal desire for 
national transmission policy to address siting issues that transcend state boundaries and 
states’ desire to avoid unnecessarily curtailing their prerogative to set policy within their 
own borders. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 attempted to address this issue by allowing 
for the designation of National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors. The Department 
of Energy was given the authority to designate certain regions as National Interest 
Electric Transmission Corridors where deficiencies in transmission investment adversely 
                                                        
12 Available on line at http://www.caiso.com/1bee/1bee7d3b3b4d0ex.html. 
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affected consumer and business interests. The DOE responded by designating two such 
corridors in 2007: one in the mid-Atlantic states and one in the Southwest (see Figure 9). 
Figure 9. National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors 
 
    
 
 The Energy Policy Act also authorizes FERC to permit investments in corridors 
crossing states that have withheld approval for more than one year. But in 2006, FERC 
promulgated rules allowing it to override states’ denials of permit applications for 
transmission projects. FERC was taken to court over these rules, and in February 2009 
the Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that FERC may issue a permit only in cases 
where states have failed to act on a permit application. It may not override states’ adverse 
decisions. 
 How national policy may be furthered in the face of this decision remains to be 
seen. Clearly, the federal government has not yet established a planning process that 
transcends state boundaries and interests and moves national energy policy forward. I 
turn next to some ideas on what kind of process might help overcome this obstacle. 
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V. Assessment 
As noted above, while the aggregate costs of needed transmission investment are quite 
high—in the many billions of dollars over the next thirty years—these costs are a small 
portion of the total costs of producing, transmitting, and distributing electricity. Even so, 
it is important to design cost-allocation schemes in an economically efficient manner, so 
that market mechanisms can provide the appropriate signals to potential investors and 
spur needed investment. 
 Still, the impediments to transmission investment for a twenty-first-century grid 
are more political than economic. Thus, Congress needs to return to the topic of National 
Interest Electric Transmission Corridors and craft legislation that prevents states from 
unilaterally holding up critical transmission projects that would relieve congestion and 
encourage the development of valuable renewable resources in otherwise stranded 
regions. While FERC has nominal responsibility for interstate transmission regulation, 
the large potential for extensive conflict between federal and state regulation makes 
transmission investment planning in an interconnected network a highly risky activity for 
the private sector. Regulatory oversight needs to reflect the logic of power flow on 
electric networks and the dictates of Kirshoff’s Laws.13 
                                                        
13 Kirshoff’s Laws describe how electricity flows in a network. Electricity cannot be 
directed along particular paths from source to destination but rather flows throughout the 
network. Thus a bilateral transaction in which electricity is generated at one node and 
consumed at another can have adverse effects on parts of the network at a distance from 
the two nodes in question. 
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 Resolving the question of the federal structure of electricity regulation is beyond 
the scope of this paper. A recent white paper on governance prepared for the Working 
Group for Investment in Reliable and Economic Electric Systems (WIRES) by Baldick et 
al. (2007) makes a number of recommendations for reconciling federal interests with 
state and regional interests. They include open and thorough planning processes, clear 
principles for defining the social benefits of transmission projects, forward-looking 
regional planning, periodic review of cost-allocation rules, and free entry for merchant 
transmission where feasible (Baldick et al., 2007, pp. 57–69). 
 The debate over the relative merits of allocating costs to beneficiaries as against 
socializing them is, in large measure, counterproductive. The sums involved are simply 
not great enough in the overall scheme. Moreover, it is seldom possible to establish a 
bright line between cases where beneficiary-pays principles should apply and those 
where cost-socialization rules should. Transmission interconnections are one place where 
beneficiary-pays principles should apply and can easily be applied. A new generator, for 
example, clearly benefits from access to the transmission grid. Interstate-transmission 
trunk lines, on the other hand, are probably better suited to cost socialization. It is 
important, however, to design cost-allocation rules that do not place merchant 
transmission lines at a competitive disadvantage in cases where those lines may be cost-
effective. 
 Given the diffuse benefits of large projects, Baldick et al. (2007) recommend a 
presumption of cost socialization, and then further recommend socializing these costs to 
load, on the grounds that the costs will ultimately be borne by consumers, in any case. 
Whether costs will be fully passed forward to consumers is an empirical question that 
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depends on a number of factors, including the degree of congestion on the grid. In fact, 
once one allows for congestion and the possibility of market power on the part of 
generators, it is possible that the burden of the costs will be affected by the cost-
allocation decision.14 A fruitful area for future research might be the incidence of cost 
allocation in congested networks where market power comes into play. 
 Finally, as noted by Baldick et al. (2007), it would be desirable to remove 
transmission investment costs from state retail rate bases and move them to wholesale 
rates prospectively, to be sure, and retroactively, to the extent possible. One goal of the 
restructuring of wholesale electrical markets and the development of competitive 
merchant generation has been to shift risks from retail customers to investors. Shifting 
risk to investors while allowing them to earn rates of return that reflect that risk 
contributes to efficient capital investment in electricity infrastructure. To the extent that 
transmission capital costs are borne by consumers in retail rates, the consumers are the 
residual bearers of risk. Retail rate proceedings effectively pass the costs of poor 
investments on to consumers (except in egregious cases of ill-advised investments) as 
well as the benefits of prudent investment decisions (in the form of reduced future rates 
or lower rate increases). Here the open-access architecture of the wholesale transmission 
grid comes into conflict with a state’s focus on regulating rates paid by consumers within 
its borders. Sale of transmission services to another utility creates revenue that the state 
                                                        
14 This stands in contrast to the general principle in tax analysis that the economic 
incidence of a tax (the distributional impact of a tax after equilibrium adjustments in 
prices have occurred) is unaffected by the statutory incidence of a tax (the issue of who is 
legally responsible for remitting a tax payment to the government). 
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recognizes by reducing the rates paid by in-state customers. In effect, state retail rate-
making confounds efforts to develop a national—or, at least, an interstate—wholesale 
market in transmission. 
 The bottleneck in investment in grid expansion and improvement is not lack of 
federal funding but rather a failure to recognize that grid investments offer benefits that 
transcend state boundaries, provided that they are shaped by a planning process that is 
open, transparent, and credible. While it is important for political and historical reasons to 
recognize the role that states play in electricity planning, a better coordinated federal, 
regional, and state approach will be needed to move projects forward. 
VI. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have provided an overview of issues related to investment in a 
national transmission network and have made the following points. First, the historical 
pace of transmission investments will not be adequate to enhance grid reliability—a 
critical necessity—or to unleash the potential for generating electricity from the wind, the 
sun, or the earth. 
 Second, the replacement of a vertically integrated electric utility industry in many 
parts of the country by a more disaggregated one composed of merchant generators has 
added to the challenge of transmission planning and investment. Under a vertically 
integrated structure, a single firm working with state and federal regulators could plan 
generation, transmission, and distribution; under a disaggregated structure, generation 
and load servicing are routinely handled by different entities that may be at a great 
geographic distance from one another. Add to that the geographic distance between load 
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centers and regions rich in renewable resources, and the importance of an interstate 
transmission network becomes that much more apparent. 
 Third, the focus on federal funding for grid improvements is misplaced. There is 
no evidence that the private sector is incapable of raising the funds needed for critical 
investment, provided a rationalized regulatory structure is put into place. Clear protocols 
on transmission planning and cost recovery are essential, as is some resolution of the 
issue of federal and state regulatory overlap. Federal preemption of siting may be 
necessary to prevent state-level holdups, but it must be done in a way that respects the 
federal nature of the U.S. political system. 
 Making changes to our regulatory and political systems that facilitate transmission 
investment and siting will not be easy. But the costs of underinvesting in an improved 
and enlarged national transmission grid are high. Moving to a largely carbon-free 
economy by the middle of the century will require a transformation of the power system 
in this country, one that cannot be successful without a strong interstate high-voltage 
transmission backbone. 
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